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A RE-EVALUATION OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONY
IN THE LIGHT OF ITS PURPOSE
By
PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN *
THE recent development in American federal criminal evidence
law to be examined and compared with English law in this paper,
is a new evolutionary turn taken by the husband-wife privilege
against adverse spousal testimony, manifest in the Supreme Court
decision of Wyatt v. United States.' The House of Lords, in
Rumping v. D.P.P., 2 just decided, suggests that the English
spousal privileges might be susceptible of similar development.
THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The ancient common law incompetency of one spouse to testify
for or against the other in legal proceedings has, in the federal
jurisdiction of the United States, eroded into at least two broad
privilege principles.' The confidential marital communications
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Michigan.
362 U.S. 525 (1960).
2 (1962) 46 Cr.App.R. 398 (H.L.).
8 The erosion has been primarily non-statutory, and substantially follows the
English common law, Lord Coke being largely responsible for the substitution
of the privileges in place of incompetency. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1951), paraphrases part of the Supreme
Court's decision in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) (dealing with
the history of husband-wife privileges): ". . . the admissibility of evidence,
competency, and privileges of witnesses shall be governed by common-law
principles, as interpreted by the Federal courts in the light of reason and
experience."
A similar, though less clear-cut, erosion of spousal incompetency has taken
place among the individual states, with which this paper is not principally
concerned. The progress in the states has been primarily statutory: e.g.,
Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-2019, 43-2020 (1947); Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1410,
38-1604 (1935); Iowa Code § 622.7 (1950); Miss. Code Ann. § 1689 (1922);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1203 (1948); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2, 97-4 (1939); Ohio
Gen. Code Ann. § 1344-2; Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 702 (1941); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 19 § 683 (1930); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 714 (1938); Ala. Code
Ann. tit. 15 § 311 (1940); Ariz. Code Ann. § 44-2702 (1939); Cal. Pen. Code§ 1322 (1949); Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 8800 (1949); Mass. Ann. Laws Ch.
233. 320 (1933); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.916 (1959); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 1214 (1952); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1881 (1955); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2-1713,
2-1714, 9-1602 (Burns 1955 and Supp. 1960); Me. Rev. Stat. Ch. 135 § 22
(1944); N.Y. Penal Code § 2445 (1951); Tenn. Code-Ann. § 9778 (1934); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 325.18 (West 1957); Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38 § 734 (1959).
(Grouped according to similarity, and within each group, alphabetically.
Selection based upon importance, typicality and representative geographic
distribution.) See also Turner v. State, 60 Miss. 351 (1882).
See generally 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) §§ 2228, 2239
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privilege 4 permits the suppression in any civil or criminal case
of so much of a spouse's testimony (or a third person's testimony or
other perhaps documentary evidence, in some circumstances 5) as
may reveal confidences 6 passed between the spouses by reason of the
marital relationship. 7  The adverse spousal testimony privilege 8
permits the suppression of all testimony of one spouse against the
other, in the latter's criminal prosecution. The distinctions are
clear: The first privilege applies only to prevent disclosure of
confidential marital communications; the second can entirely
prevent the spouse from taking the stand as a witness adverse to
the other connubial partner, regardless of the subject-matter of
the expected testimony. The first applies in civil and criminal
litigation; the second seems to be confined to criminal. The
first applies regardless of whether the testimony is for or against
the spouse; the second can prevent only testimony adverse to him.
The first may cover evidence other than spousal testimony; the
second cannot. The first applies whether or not a spouse is party
to the litigation; the second requires it. Only the second applies
when the testimony does not relate to matters transpiring during
the marriage." Only the second is destroyed by divorce. 10
(Wigmore is the foremost American authority on evidence); McCormick,
Evidence (1954) §§ 68-80; 38 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1952); 56 NW. U.L. Rev. 208
(1961).
4 See (1961) 56 NW. U.L. Rev. 208 for an exhaustive treatment of all aspects of
this privilege.
5 See (1961) 56 NW. U.L. Rev. 208. Where the third person overhearing or
obtaining knowledge of the contents of the interspousal communication did so
with the knowledge, negligence, consent or complicity of a spouse, the con-
fidentiality of the communication, and hence the privilege, may be entirely
destroyed; or the privilege to keep a spouse silent may still prevail, but not to
keep the third party silent, depending upon the court, upon which spouse
(communicant or communicatee) was responsible for the disclosure to the third
party, and upon the aggravation of the circumstances. The communicant's
and communicatee's privileges may be affected differently, according to their
relative responsibility for the disclosure to the third party. These problems
frequently arise in an "eavesdropper " context.
s i.e., "confidential communications." A cluster of problems occurs: What is
necessary to constitute " confidentiality "9 Are acts " communications "9 etc.
See Hawkins v. United States, 249 F. 2d 273 (10th Cir. 1957) (acts and events
of a prostitution racket not - confidential communications ").
7 Obviously many communications between spouses might also have taken place
had they been unmarried. Only communications made in reliance on the
marital relationship--i.e., communications that would not have been made
but for the relationship-are protected. It is not surprising that many factual
problems arise in connection with this determination.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 137 F. 2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943); Levine v.
United States, 163 F. 2d 992 (5th Cir. 1947).
9 This is dictated by the policies behind the privileges, discussed infra at text
accompanying footnotes 12-14. See also United States v. Williams, 55 F.
Supp. 375 (D. Minn. 1944); Wyatt v. United States, 263 F. 2d 304 (5th Cir.
1959).
10 This too is dictated by the policies of the privileges, discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 12-14. See also Pereira v. United States, 202 F. 2d 830
(5th Cir. 1953).
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At least prior to Wyatt, the general federal rule was that the
privileges belong in each case to both spouses 11 and are exercisable
by each alone and independently, regardless of the wishes of the
other. This is somewhat logical with respect to the confidential
communications privilege, whose policy is to encourage all husbands
and wives to entrust marital confidences to their spouses. 12 For
disclosure in court of a confidence might embarrass either or both. 13
But the policy of the adverse testimony privilege is to preserve
normal harmony in the particular marriage involved. 14  The
exercisability problems peculiar to such a policy will largely occupy
our attention for the remainder of this paper.' 5 We shall begin by
11 The communicant and communicatee under the confidential marital communi-
cations privilege; the witness and the accused under the privilege against
adverse spousal testimony.
Contra on the communications privilege: United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.
2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943), affd. 138 F. 2d 831 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied 321
U.S. 794 (1944), rehearing denied 322 U.S. 768 (1944) (Mann Act prosecution:
privilege belongs to both but testimony admissible if either one waives)..
12 See Hutchins & Slesinger, " Some Observations on the Law of Evidence:
Family Relations," (1929) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 675; McCormick, Evidence
(1954) § 82; and authority collected therein.
13 Even where its communicator desires its disclosure, the communication would,
if repeated in court, embarrass its communicatee if it was responsive to and
reveals by implication the contents of a prior communication made by and
prejudicial to the communicatee. Spousal exchanges are generally a unified
transaction with the comments or actions of one spouse intimately linked to,
prompted by, and reflective of the other spouse's actions or comments to
which they refer. The jury can usually reconstruct both sides of the exchange
by hearing one side.
14 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) § 2239 and cases cited throughout
this paper.
Notice my use of the words "preserve " and "normal." The privilege
does not attempt to produce harmony that is not already there; it is merely
intended to prevent judicial interference with existing harmony. This
becomes important in our consideration of divorce and separation, infra. Nor
should the law attempt to preserve perverted, abnormal, undesirable marriages.
This becomes important in our discussion of prostitution, infra.
The marital harmony policy is based upon the perhaps mistaken assumption
that the defendant-spouse would resent his spouse for giving adverse testimony,
even were that testimony compulsory. Wigmore, supra, suggests that a
better policy explanation would be that our natural sense of justice is
outraged at the thought of a person's spouse testifying against him in a
criminal prosecution. I find that this begs the question.
Another point to remember here is that the privileges are impediments to
the judicial ascertainment of truth, since they may prevent the introduction
of competent, reliable and relevant evidence. Therefore, they should be no
broader than is absolutely necessitated by some overriding policy consideration.
'5 Thus I will substantially abandon further discussion of the confidential
marital communications privilege, in spite of its many fascinating problems,
having treated it superficially for purposes of distinguishing it from the other
husband-wife privilege. Wyatt and Hawkins (discussed infra) concern only
the adverse spousal testimony privilege. Both lower courts held the confidential
communications privilege inapplicable, in Wyatt because the spousal testimony
concerned matters learned by the witness-spouse before the marriage, 263 F.
2d 304 (5th Cir. 1959), and in Hawkins because the testimony concerned the
acts and events of a prostitution business, which were not confidential inter-
spousal communications, 249 F. 2d 273 (10th Cir. 1957) ). Wyatt and Hawkins
tacitly raise anew difficult marital harmony policy questions which thus become
currently important.
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discussing how the law should be, not necessarily how it is. Then
we can can compare the actual state of the law with this normative
paragon. In discussing how the law should be, we will see that
different rules concerning who has the privilege should govern in
different types of situations, and that it is unrealistic to have a
general rule that the privilege belongs to both spouses.
In the very rare situation where the defendant-spouse does not
care to raise the privilege, there is little risk of marital discord in
taking adverse spousal testimony, regardless of the wishes of the
witness-spouse?16 Other situations become more complex. Consider
first situations in which the only information practicably cognisable
by the court concerning harmony in the marriage, is the position
taken by both spouses on the privilege issue. Assume also that
there is no extraordinary necessity for the testimony. Where the
defendant-spouse cares to exclude the testimony (which is virtually
always the case), the testimony should be received if the witness-
spouse so wishes, inasmuch as the witness-spouse thereby indicates
that there is little marital harmony to preserve or salvage, absent
otlier circumstances indicating that the witness's willingness to
testify is more likely the manifestation of a temporary spurt of
anger or moral compunction, as might be the case where the
defendant had seriously wronged the witness shortly before the
trial. The witness's unwillingness to testify should be respected
because it indicates harmony in the marriage, absent circumstances
suggesting that the unwillingness was procured by fear and coercion
exerted by the defendant. 17
16 Cf. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) § 2241 where, apparently on the
basis of this virtually non-existent situation, Wigmore hastily concludes that
since it is resentment by the defendant-spouse that endangers marital harmony,
the privilege should belong only to him; for he will resent the taking of
testimony only where he raises the privilege, in which case the testimony
should be excluded because the violation of his wishes will produce marital
discord; but the testimony should be admitted where he does not raise the
privilege, because that will not violate his wishes and hence will not produce
marital discord. This argument ignores the fact that in many situations,
the defendant-spouse will be unable to raise the privilege because of ignorance,
mistake, involuntary waiver, loss of privilege, estoppel, untimely invocation, or
other operation of law-although he still wishes to exclude the testimony and
will resent its admission. In such a case there may be good grounds for
excluding the testimony to save the marriage. The exclusion could then come
about either by allowing the witness-spouse to raise the privilege; or by
abolishing the legal technicalities disabling the defendant-spouse. Wigmore
also forgets that the wishes of the witness-spouse may indicate whether there
is any marital harmony to preserve. See following text.
17 The effect of Wigmore's proposal, supra, note 16, would be almost precisely the
opposite. The privilege would belong exclusively to the defendant, and would
usually be asserted by him. Thus a spouse willing to testify would ordinarily
be prevented from so doing, in spite of the obvious lack of marital harmony.
Furthermore, where the defendant lost his privilege through some technicality,
an unwilling spouse would be compelled to testify, in spite of the obvious
marital harmony. The first-mentioned anomaly is also prevalent under the
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Let us now consider the effect of circumstances which were
excluded from discussion in the last paragraph, but which bear
on normal marital harmony. We will continue to assume that
there is no extraordinary need for the testimony. In certain
circumstances, there will be little marital harmony of the type
the law strives to preserve: serious wrongs committed by the
defendant-spouse against the witness-spouse 25; prolonged and con-
tinuous adultery or prostitution 19; separation or divorce 20; sham
marriage or marriage contracted in order to acquire the privilege.
Under the first and second categories, it is irrelevant whether the
wrong is the one being tried in the case at bar. 21  The " victim "
witness-spouse's uncoerced marriage to or cohabitation with the
defendant after the wrong, or her voluntary acquiescence in,
consent to, or co-operation in the wrong, would tend to nullify
the indications of marital strife produced by the wrong. Her
unwillingness to testify would not necessarily have this effect.
For, unwillingness when there has been such a wrong is more
likely the product of fear and coercion wrought by the defendant,
than of strong marital ties; unless accompanied by one of the acts
of forgiveness just mentioned. Willingness to testify would seem
to corroborate the presumption of marital discord arising from the
wrong.
It is not judicially feasible to investigate much further than
this into whether in a particular case there is in fact marital
harmony to preserve, and whether in fact a particular unwilling-
ness to testify is the product of tender love or coercion. The
traditional rule, since both spouses have the privilege. When the defendant
loses his privilege by virtue of a technicality, the traditional rule gives proper
effect to the wishes of the witness-spouse.
18 This would indicate the nature and strength of feelings between the
spouses.
19 This would not only indicate the nature and strength of feelings between the
spouses, but would also be relevant in the determination of whether this is thedesirable kind of marriage the law strives to preserve.
20 Can divorce and separation be distinguished on the grounds that in separation
there is a possibility of reunion? Is it the function of the privilege to help
restore lost union, or at least to prevent the court from further reducing the
possibilities of reunion? See second paragraph of note 14 supra. Where the
possibility of reunion is so slim, are we justified in barring evidence on thebasis of that contingency? See ibid., paragraph 4.
21 To avoid unduly protracted collateral inquiry into wrongs other than those in
central issue in the case at Bar, the court could, on the privilege question,
limit itself to investigation of convictions or judgments on record, or perhaps
to undisputed or indisputable wrongs. Where the judge felt time permitted,
and the issue was serious enough, he might consider a limited amount of
evidence, perhaps only affidavits, concerning disputed wrongs not of record.
The privilege issue should be decided out of the hearing of the jury so thatdiscussion of these collateral wrongs would not prejudice the defendant on the
main issue of the litigation. The relevance and probativeness of such
collateral wrongs must be strictly limited to the privilege issue.
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courts should rely upon the presumptions that flow from the few
readily discoverable circumstances just outlined: the position of
the spouses on the admissibility issue, wrongs and immoralities
of record or beyond dispute or established by affidavit, obvious
characteristics of the marriage, " forgiveness " by cohabitation
or marriage, etc. 22  The presumptions are then likely to be correct
quite often, and occasional errors are justified by the judicial
economy resulting from so limiting inquiry.
2
Thus it is possible to first ascertain whether or not there is
marital harmony worth preserving in a particular case, before
reaching the question of whether there is any special, compelling,
peculiar, extraordinary necessity for the testimony. It is clear
that according to the seriousness of the charge and the availability
of other evidence, the degree of necessity for spousal testimony is
continuously variable from case to case, and can be practicably
determined in each case by a somewhat ad hoc though necessarily
limited examination of the kind of crime and the prosecution's
evidence in that case, which inquiry is neither unduly extensive
nor judicially uneconomical.
Consequently, one way to decide in each case whether adverse
spousal testimony should be admitted or excluded under the
privilege, would be to make separate and distinct determinations
of marital harmony, and of necessity, and then to balance them
against each other. A high degree of marital harmony (determined
from the strength of proof, expectations and intensity of normal
harmony in the marriage) when coupled with a low degree of
necessity, would mean that the testimony stays out. But while
degrees of necessity may be roughly ascertained by judges through
experience, and have always been so ascertained for purposes of
discovery and evidence, our proposed formula for determining
marital harmony tends to yield an answer in terms of the existence
or non-existence of marital harmony worth saving in a particular
22 It is not too much to ask the court to inquire this far into the privilege
matter. After all, spousal testimony is often the crucial evidence, and the
privilege question is likely to be very important to both sides. Indeed, in
most of the cases cited in this paper, the presence or absence of the spousal
testimony was critical.
23 It is frequently said that in order to induce the ordinary non-litigating
married couples in the population to rely, in the conduct of their daily matters.
on the future availability of the privilege, the privilege as developed in past
cases must appear to them absolute, certain of applicability, relatively free
from esoteric exceptions, and highly predictable; and that therefore the circum-
stances outlined in this text should not be inquired into in each case. But even
if the basic premise of this argument is true, the adverse spousal testimony
privilege, unlike the marital confidential communications privilege, is uncon-
cerned with inducing reliance, as discussed above in connection with policy.
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marriage, and does not indicate degrees thereof. Any other
approach becomes unbelievably cumbersome.
Therefore, admissibility or exclusion under the privilege should
be decided in the following manner. Where there is no necessity
for the testimony, the ordinary rules of trial procedure concerning
superfluous evidence would of course keep it out. Where there
is ordinary necessity, admissibility should turn upon the presence
or absence of marital harmony worth preserving. Where there is
extraordinary necessity, the testimony should come in regardless
of the presence or absence of marital harmony. A more precise
formulation, including a ranking of categories of cases according
to necessity, would then develop. This balancing is not unlike
that traditionally engaged in for purposes of qualified privileges,
discovery, and ordinary admissibility. 24 This is a suggested method
of approach, heuristic and not exhaustive.
But the courts have not employed these methods of analysis,
at least before Wyatt. The privilege resided in both spouses, except
in a few situations superficially resembling some of those outlined
above. The rules governing these exceptions permitted even less
factual examination than advocated herein; and as a result the
presumptions underlying the rules were more. frequently incorrect
as applied to particular cases, than is justifiable in the name of
judicial economy resultant from limiting inquiry.
For example, the courts took no cognisance of wrongs com-
mitted by one spouse against the other, except for crimes of
physical violence 25 for which the defendant was being tried in
the case at Bar, in which event only the defendant was deprived
of his privilege, not on the grounds that there was little marital
harmony to preserve, but on the spurious grounds of exceptional
necessity: that the injured spouse must testify because she was the
only witness, which was always assumed to be true despite the
frequent surplus of other witnesses. This was called the " special
24 The attorney's work-product privilege articulated in Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S.. 495 (1947) is almost precisely analogous. See also the privileges
surrounding grand jury matters, (1960) 55 N W. U.L.Rev. 482, and matters
of government interest, (1961) 56 NW. U.L.Rev. 283.
25 The crime charged generally had to be one of physical violence, such as
assault or rape, against the person of the witness-spouse. This "special
necessity exception," like the general privilege, was substantially lifted by
the federal courts from the English common law. Lord Audley's Case
(1631) 3 How.St.Tr. 401, is often cited as the classic example of the
necessity exception. The defendant hired several ruffians to rape his wife
and stood by watching as they carried it out. The wife was allowed to testify
over his objections. Cf. Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209, 38 U.S. 209 (1839)
(although a civil case, this is frequently cited as an accurate restatement of
the common law necessity exception).
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necessity exception," despite the abundance of cases not compre-
hended in the exception, in which the witness-spouse's testimony
was equally or more necessary. Furthermore, exceptionally neces-
sary testimony remains equally exceptionally necessary regardless
of the wishes of the witness; and if anything, the unusual necessity
would seem to dictate not that the witness should have the
choice to testify, but that she must testify. Therefore, the respect
the necessity exception accorded the wishes of the witness-spouse
probably was motivated not by considerations of necessity, but
by considerations of marital harmony, which was avowedly recog-
nised along with necessity as an operative value. But many
things relevant to marital harmony were overlooked, only a few
of which need repetition, they all being enumerated above. In
these cases of violent crime against the witness-spouse, the unwilling-
ness of the latter to testify should not necessarily be respected
because it may be the result of coercion in an embittered marriage,
rather than of marital bliss.2 8  Serious spousal wrongs of a non-
violent and/or non-criminal nature, and collateral wrongs not
tried in the case at Bar, might nonetheless negate the existence
of normal marital harmony and destroy all justification for exclu-
sion, especially when coupled with the witness-spouse's willingness
to testify."1 Voluntary marriage after, 28 and/or consent to the
wrong might restore harmony and justification for exclusion, parti-
cularly when coupled with uncoerced unwillingness to testify.29
26 Wyatt, discussed infra, intimates that, the trial involving a serious crime by
the defendant-spouse against the witness-spouse, the unwillingness to testify
was probably coerced by the defendant. But such insight was inappropriate in
that case, where other feasibly cognisable facts indicated the absence of
coercion. See note 29 infra, first paragraph and accompanying text.
27 For a serious failure to recognise this, see e.g., Hawkins v. United States,
358 U.S. 74 (1958), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 34-36.
28 The necessity exception deprives the defendant of his privilege even when
the marriage between the spouses took place after the crime. United States v.
Williams, 55 F.Supp. 375 (D. Minn. 1944). Contra: United States v.
Gwynne, 209 Fed. 993 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
2D All of these factors were present in Wyatt, and yet the testimony was still
excluded.
In summary, the necessity exception improperly treats the witness's
willingness or unwillingness to testify, where there has been a seriou s wrong
committed by the defendant against the witness. In a necessity exception
case where that witness is willing to testify, the traditional rule properly
allows the testimony. But where, in the same situation, the witness is
unwilling, that wish is, improperly, respected automatically under the rule.
Where the wrong by the defendant against the witness is serious but does not
come within the literal terms of the necessity exception, the defendant is, quite
irrationally, able to defeat the willingness of the witness to testify. Unwilling-
ness to testify in such a case is, improperly, respected.
For the suggestion that the danger of perjury is not the reason why the
necessity exception permits the witness-spouse the option, see note 58 infra.
It might be noted that the necessity exception ignores degree of social neces-
sity for conviction in that non-disclosure is more likely to prevail in cases where
the crime is not against a spouse but against members of the public (in which
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Only in extremely compelling and aggravated circumstances
did the courts find marriages to be sham or contracted solely
for the purposes of acquiring the privilege, in which cases the
privilege was apparently denied both spouses, on the formal
reasoning that there had been no real marriage at all and, therefore,
one of the technical prerequisites for the operation of the privilege
was not satisfied.30 Similarly, divorce destroyed the marriage
relationship and the privileges of both spouses along with it.31
Behind these formalisms, there was a judicial recognition that in
those particular circumstances it was futile to attempt to preserve
a normal harmonious marriage, and therefore neither spouse should
be able to bar the testimony.
Traditionally, prostitution was considered only in so far as it
came within the literal terms of the " necessity exception "1:
that is, if the husband prostituted the wife and that was the
crime for which he was being tried, the husband lost his privilege.32
case both spouses have the option to invoke the privilege), than in cases where
the crime is against the witness-spouse (in which case only one spouse has
the privilege). And yet it would seem more important to gain full disclosure
in the former case toward the end that criminals perpetrating crimes with the
most widespread effects be convicted.
There is a certain superficial justice about permitting the victim-spouse
to damn or acquit her defendant-spouse where the incidence of the crime was
primarily against her rather than the public. Is this consistent with the
rarity of applicability of the doctrine of condonation (which holds that in
some cases the consent or ratification by the victim abrogates any criminal
responsibility) ? Is the court in a criminal action as distinguished from a civil
action concerned with redressing individuals, or with social retributive justice
and deterrence?
30 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (prosecution for violation of
the War Brides Act, where three American service women were paid to go to
France and go through sham marriage ceremonies with three Frenchmen to
enable the latter to enter the country; " wives " allowed to testify); United
States v. Graham, 87 F.Supp. 237 (E.D. Mich. 1949) (prosecution for interstate
transportation of money feloniously stolen from defendant's wife; wife permitted
to testify over defendant's objection; marriage contracted merely to facilitate the
crime); Pereira v. United States, 202 F. 2d 830 (5th Cir. 1953) (prosecution for
mail fraud committed against defendant's spouse; witness-spouse permitted to
testify over defendant's objections; marriage a pretence to defendant, con-
tracted to aid the scheme). (Since only the defendant raised the privilege in
these cases, we cannot be certain whether the privilege would have been
denied both spouses; but the reasoning suggests that it would. These cases
may be considered merely standard necessity exception cases.) But see
United States v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949) (defendant, a
professional " con-man " who was in the habit of preying on elderly women's
money, occasionally marrying " them if necessary, accidentally legally
married the witness-spouse, but never lived with her, considering it a sham
and marrying other women subsequently; yet the court held the volunteered
testimony of this " legal " wife inadmissible in the prosecution for one of
the later offences).
31 Periera v. United States, 202 F. 2d 830 (5th Cir. 1953).
32 The Mann Act, 62 Stat. 812 (1948) as amended 63 Stat. 96, 18 U.S.C. 2421
(1951) punishes interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes. Its
violation is the only significant crime involving prostitution cognisable by the
federal trial courts. The federal opinions have usually held that in Mann
Act prosecutions, where the defendant's wife has been the woman transported,
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This excluded many other sorts of prostitution which might
have indicated that an attempt to preserve a normal harmonious
marital relationship by suppressing the adverse spousal testimony,
would be futile. 83
The absurdity of the federal rule and its exceptions prior to
Wyatt is well illustrated by the result in the Supreme Court decision
of Hawkins v. United States . 4  In a prosecution of the husband
for a crime not against the wife, the 'wife was, in the name of
marital harmony, not permitted to testify against the husband;
despite the fact that there was plainly no marital harmony (and
certainly none of the type the law strives to preserve) since the
wife wanted to testify, and was a continuing prostitute, being
prostituted by her husband in violation of law.3 5 As noted, it
would have been judicially practicable to take cognisance of
these obvious facts.38  Yet the husband did not lose his-privilege,
because the crime, not being against his wife, did not come within
the necessity exception; and hence he was able to keep the wife
off the stand.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Wyatt v. United
States,'7 a prosecution against a husband for prostituting his wife.38
The wife was forced to testify against the husband over her and
his timely objections, and the Supreme Court affirmed the propriety
of the trial court's action. While the crime charged was plainly
within the traditional necessity exception,' 9 the court went beyond
that precedent in depriving both spouses of their privilege.4 . The
she is competent to testify against her husband, and may do so over his
objections, if she so desires. The transportation for immoral purposes is
considered a crime of physical violence against the person of the wife, bringing
it within the necessity exception, despite the lack of bodily injury of the type
necessary at common law, and despite any consent the wife may have given.
The moral injury is considered sufficient. Pappas v. United States, 241 Fed.
665 (9th Cir. 1917); Shores v. United States, 174 F. 2d 830 (8th Cir. 1949);
United States v. Williams, 55 F. Supp. 375 (D. Minn. 1944). In these cases
the wife volunteered testimony, and the courts held that defendant could not
bar it. There was no question concerning compelling the wife to testify.
Certain tacit inferences rather: vaguely hinting that the wife might be com-
pellable, in the latter two cases, are merely dictum, the decisions being
expressly reached upon the basis of the old necessity exception.
'3 e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), discussed infra.
'4 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
35 The crime tried in the case at Bar was a violation of the Mann Act, but the
wife was not the woman transported. The prostitution of the wife was a
separate offence not directly involved in the case at Bar.
The lack of normal marital relationship and harmony is made obvious by
the facts that the defendant during trial referred to the witness as his " ex-
wife " and testified that they had never lived together very much. 358 U.S.
74, 82; 249 F. 2d 735 (10th Cir. 1957).
36 See text preceding note 23 supra.
'7 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
38 Under the Mann Act. 39 See note 32 supra.
40 Although the court purported to rely on the vague dicta mentioned at the end
of note 33 supra.
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result at first seems to be as egregious as that in Hawkins, for the
opposite reason. For here the court permitted testimony that
could damage a marriage that was obviously strong and har-
monious, 41 as evidenced by the facts that the wife married the
husband after the alleged wrong, the wife zealously managed the
prostitution business as the dominant partner, 42 and she did not
wish to testify-all of which would more than negate presumptions
of coercion 4- and marital strife from the wrong, and all of which
would seem to be conveniently cognisable by the court, as noted
above. 44 The failure to consider these facts, then, cannot reasonably
be ascribed to administrative practicability. 45 Nor can it be
ascribed to a complete loss of confidence in the marital harmony
policy with a consequent abolition of the entire privilege; because
marital harmony is expressly mentioned as the justification for the
privilege,48 and the whole tone of the opinion seems to imply some
limit on its own scope, confining it somehow to this case or type of
case. 4T Nor can the decision be reasonably ascribed to an expan-
sion in this peculiar situation of the effect of the necessity exception
on the grounds that this case or type of case involves extra-special
necessity for testimony; because necessity is not mentioned. No
investigation of need in this particular case was made, although a
rudimentary inquiry of this kind is not unduly inconvenient 4s; and
there is nothing to distinguish the necessity in this type of case from
the necessity in other equally or more serious prosecutions, so
therefore the expanded necessity exception would tend to consume
the general privilege rule, contrary to the limiting tone of the
41 On first glance it appears that Hawktns is effectively overruled. For if the
court is willing to disrupt the firmer marriage in Wyatt by allowing the
testimony, then a fortiori it would be willing to disrupt the infirm marriage in
Hawkins by allowing the testimony. Less marital damage would be done by
permitting the testimony in Hawkins than was actually done in Wyatt.
42 Testimony clearly indicated that the woman made all the arrangements with
the hotel bellboy, and discussed business opportunities with him, while the
husband spent most of his time in the room, drinking.
43 Cf. text accompanying notes 54 to 56 infra.
44 Note 23 supra and text preceding it.
45 The court does, however, say (at page 530): " To make matters turn upon
ad hoc inquiries into the actual state of mind of particular women . . . is
hardly an acceptable solution." But we may take this as imposing no greater
limits on inquiry than advocated in this paper at note 23 supra and text
preceding it.
46 The opinion mentions the marital harmony policy as the basis of the privilege,
at p. 527. An abandonment of the marital harmony policy would of course be
totally inconsistent with Hawkins.
47 " We deal here only with a Mann Act prosecution, and intimate no view on
the applicability of the privilege of either a party or a witness similarly
circumstanced in other situations."' Opinion, p. 531. This is important in
my textual discussion that follows.
48 See text following note 23 supra.
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opinion. 49  One possibility is that the court accepted, on the
authority of cases holding Mann Act prosecutions to be within
the necessity exception, that there was the special necessity for the
testimony here that is always incident upon necessity exception
prosecutions 50; and held that, contrary to authority, special
necessity is unaffected by the wishes of the witness, 51 and therefore
the testimony should always be taken in necessity exception cases
regardless of those wishes, marital harmony being irrelevant in the
face of necessity. However, if the court were reformulating the
entire necessity exception, it would have gone all the way and
penetrated the fiction that there was special necessity here. At
any rate, the court disclaims any such broad revision of the whole
necessity exception. 2 The court also rejects the suggestion that
witness-spouses cannot own the privilege."
The rationale actually articulated by the court is that the Mann
Act, intended to protect defenceless females from subjugation,
irrebuttably presumes that the woman transported and prostituted
had no will of her own and was completely dominated by and
49 However, this rationale would have the advantage of tending to reconcile
Hawkins and Wyatt. A perusal of both cases reveals a greater availability
of other evidence and testimony in the former, and hence a greater necessity
for the spousal testimony in the latter. Is this assessment properly made at
the appellate level after all evidence is revealed? The court makes no mention
of necessity at all, either with respect to the seriousness of the offence or the
amount and nature of the testimony. This is quite understandable.
It could conceivably be suggested, somewhat unconvincingly, that Mann Act
cases can be distinguished from ordinary necessity exception cases in that
there is a greater social necessity for conviction of criminals perpetrating
crimes of the Mann Act variety which have detrimental effects primarily
upon members of the general public, than for conviction of criminals who
hurt primarily their spouses. Is this consistent with the statements in the
opinion to the effect that the Mann Act offence is primarily against the
transportee (see text accompanying note 54 infra), who was the witness-
spouse in this case? Does society really have more of an interest in prevent-
ing prostitution than in preventing crimes of violence? Has not the responsible
legislative authority decided the issue of social objectionability in drafting the
criminal proscription and a penalty of a certain severity? Is the individual
incidence of conduct a criminal or civil concern? Are not all crimes socially
noxious? Is the suggested function properly judicial when arrogated to a
court sitting in criminal jurisdiction ?
50 This would distinguish Hawkins (which was not a traditional necessity
exception prosecution).
51 Compare this entire rationale with the material presented in text, several
sentences preceding note 26, supra.
52 " Neither can we hold that, whenever theprivilege is unavailable to the party,
it is ipso facto lost to the witness as well. It is a question in each case, or
in each category of cases, whether, in light of the reason which has led to a
refusal to recognise the party's privilege, the witness should be held compell-
able. Certainly we would not be justified in laying down a general rule that
both privileges stand or fall together." The opinion, p. 529.
53 See the opinion at p. 529: " We decline to accept the view thatthe privilege
is that of the party alone." Cf. note 16 supra.
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subordinated to the will of the accused. 4 Thus the court concludes
that the marriage and refusal to testify were coerced by and
manifested the will of the husband, and were not the voluntary acts
of the wife. They were his will alone, not hers. Hence, either the
marriage was sham, in which case the privilege is inapplicable, 5' or
the ostensible assertion of the privilege by the wife was in reality
rather the indirect and improper assertion by the husband of a
privilege he had lost through the ordinary operation of the standard
necessity exception as traditionally applied in Mann Act cases,
although a privilege still validly subsisted in the wife and could
have been exercised, had she sufficient freedom of will.' 6
The reasoning is obviously fallacious. The facts of the case
indicated that the wife dominated the husband.57 Even if a general
irrebuttable presumption of subordination of the transported by the
transporter in this type of prosecution is justifiable on the grounds
of expediency and ninety-times-out-of-one-hundred accuracy despite
occasional discrepancies, the presumption certainly pertains only
to the inability to resist the transportation and immoralities, and is
not intended to imply an across-the-board lack of will for all
purposes, such as testimony and marriage. Furthermore, if such
a general presumption is to prevail in Mann Act cases, there is no
reason why it should not apply to other equally or more serious
crimes involving the complicity of the spouse. The decision would
not seem to be intended to have such far-reaching consequences.
Finally, a general presumption of this nature would appear to sug-
gest that the compelled testimony will very likely be perjured, and
should not be admitted.58
It is difficult to believe that so palpably unacceptable a rationale
motivated that venerable court. A truer, though unarticulated and
54 Denning v. United States, 247 Fed. 463 (5th Cir. 1918), one of the earliest
cases construing the Mann Act and describing the reasoning behind it, is
cited for this proposition, as are the Congressional debates preceding the
enactment. See p. 530 of the Wyatt opinion.
55 See note 30 supra and accompanying text. This rationale would seem to
distinguish Hawkins, where the wife did not technically come within the
presumption of the Mann Act. But there may have been as much reason
to invoke a similar presumption of lack of independent will in Hawkins.
The lack of will rendering the marriage sham is not specifically emphasised
in Wyatt. Rather, the lack of will to exercise the privilege is.
56 This rationale would distinguish Hawkins.
57 See note 42 supra.
58 The standard necessity exception is occasionally defended on the ground that
even though the accused has lost his privilege, the witness-spouse must
retain hers to avoid the perjury that compelled testimony is likely to entail
in such a situation. But there is always the danger of perjury when testimony
is compelled, and especially is this true where one sibling is compelled to
testify against another in the same immediate family or against his own
parent, or a parent against his own child, or any relative against relative, or
friend against friend. And yet, such witnesses are not accorded privileges.
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therefore extra-legal, explanation of the result must be discoverable,
toward the end that future behaviour of the court may be to some
extent predicted.59 I suspect that the decision was actually dictated
by considerations concerning the nature of prostitution. As
indicated, many factors suggested that the marriage was strongly
cohesive, 0 so that the case was not a particularly compelling one
for establishing a general irrebuttable presumption against marital
harmony where there is prostitution of this kind. Rather, I cannot
help thinking that the court felt that these were not the type of
marriages to be fostered."' If such is the case, it would matter
little whether the spousal prostitution were involved in the case at
Bar, as in Wyatt, or collaterally, as in Hawkins (which on this
rationale would be reversed) 02; and whether the Mann Act were in
any way involved.
Other serious spousal immoralities less distributive and com-
mercial than prostitution (such as pre-marital relations between
the now spouses, which incidentally is punishable under the Mann
Act when it motivates the interstate trip (3) would not necessarily
have the same consequence.
50 This may be somewhat reminiscent of Lord Denning, who feels that too
much attention can be paid to the expressed reasoning in a decision, rather
than the result. See his address before the Oxford Law Society, University
College, Michaelmas Term, 1961.
60 See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
61 Cf. second paragraph of note 14 supra.
The language at p. 527 of the opinion suggests the conclusion in the text
accompanying this note: " . . . [I]t cannot be seriously argued that one who
has committed this ' shameless offense against wifehood ' . . . should be
permitted . . . [to invoke] an interest founded on the marital relation or the
desire of the law to protect it."
Again, at p. 529: "Where a man has prostituted his own wife, he has
committed an offense against both her and the marital relationship .. "(This feeling on the part of the court may have been coupled with the feeling
that somehow there was special necessity for the testimony here; and that
therefore an undesirable marriage should not be preserved at least where
there is special necessity for the testimony. But we have seen that there was
no special necessity revealed in this case; and any suspicion that there was
derives from the fiction propagated by stare decisis that necessity exception
prosecutions always involve special necessity. Furthermore, the court does
not mention necessity or the social desirability of conviction.)
62 Actually, it is better if the prostitution in issue on the privilege question is
not part of the ultimate issue of the case. (The best of such situations occurs
if the prostitution in issue on the privilege question has already been collater-
ally determined in another judicial proceeding.) Nevertheless, it is not unheard
of for the trial judge to make a preliminary decision, for evidentiary admission
or exclusion purposes, of matters ultimately substantively in issue, even
though the jury may later decide differently than the judge (which would not
in any way affect the propriety of the judge's ruling or compel its reversal).
It might be interesting to note at this point that the presumptions under-
lying the standard necessity exception, and the presumption of lack of inde-
pendent will supposedly indulged by the Wyatt court, assume that the accused
is guilty of the crime even before the jury has heard the evidence and
reached a decision.
03 See first sentence of note 32 supra.
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ENGLISH LAW
If this is indeed the " rationale " behind Wyatt, it is sound, and
could be transplanted advantageously into the English law of
evidentiary privilege, which would be congenial to it because this
area of the law is basically similar on both sides of the Atlantic. 4
However, the transplanting would probably have to be statutory,
since in England the erosion of the old common law incompetency
into the two spousal privileges is largely codified. 65 The Wyatt
principle could be incorporated into both the confidential inter-
spousal communications privilege and the adverse spousal
testimony privilege, since it appears that in England the policy
of both is to preserve the instant marriage, contrary to the
American rule, where this is the policy only of the latter.
64 For the English law on the privileges, see note 65 infra. Regarding English
offences against sexual morality which could produce the same effect that is
discussed herein in connection with the American ]aw, above, see Sexual
Offences Act, 1956; Street Offences Act, 1959; R. v. Chapman [1959] 1 Q.B.
100 (C.C.A.) (indicates that the law recognises sexual immorality alone as
unlawful for some purposes); Shaw v. D.P.P. [1961] 2 W.L.R. 897 (H.L.)
(living off the earnings of prostitution; the " Ladies Directory Case ").
65 Matrimonial communications: " No husband shall be compellable to disclose
any communication made to him by his wife during the marriage, and no
wife shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her
husband during marriage."
Evidence Amendment Act, 1853, s. 3; Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 1
(d); Workmen's Compensation (Supplementation) Act, 1951, s. 4 (5) proviso.
See also Shenton v. Tyler [1939] Ch. 620 and criticism thereof by the late
Sir William Holdsworth, in (1939) 56 L.Q.R. 137. The extent to which
evidence other than testimony, such as letters or documents, may be suppressed
on the grounds that it reveals a matrimonial communication, is discussed
infra in connection with Rumping v. D.P.P.
Adverse spousal testimony: Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, ss. 1 (c), 4; and
other more particular Acts which make certain minor inroads upon this Act
in a few selected situations, to be mentioned infra. A spouse is incompetent
to testify for the prosecution of his or her consort, unless the latter gives
permission, in which case the former can testify but is not generally com-
pellable. It is easily seen that this substantially amounts to the traditional
American federal adverse spousal testimony privilege belonging to both
spouses, with the exception that the English defendant-spouse's privilege is
automatically exercised unless he waives it voluntarily. By abolishing, to
some extent, involuntary waiver, the English rule probably aids the marital
harmony policy by eliminating one source of marital friction that is present
in the American rule. The English rule preserves the error, noted above as
a failing of the American rule, of gbnerally granting the privilege to both
spouses without legislative, let alone individual judicial, consideration of the
factors mentioned as important in the text accompanying notes 16-25 supra.
But some progress beyond the American view has been made by the English
along these lines. For the defendant's privilege is destroyed not only if the
case falls into one of the crimes categorised under the common law necessity
exception described above, but also if it falls into one or more of certain other
statutorily enumerated categories of crime, which presumably were selected
roughly on the basis of seriousness, offensiveness, and desirability of and
likelihood of preserving the marriage. (However, these considerations lead to
a deprivation of both spouses of their privilege only in a strictly confined
group of instances, discussed infra.) In general they are offences involving
either sexual immorality, disturbance of the family relationship, or harm to
youngsters; which adds support to the thesis advanced in this paper.
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Although the English authorities frequently repeat that the policy
behind the privilege preserving the confidentiality of marital
communications is the same as in the federal jurisdiction of the
United States, namely, to encourage all husbands and wives to
communicate freely with their consorts, "" this is apparently belied
by the facts that the privilege belongs solely to and may be invoked
only by the spouse receiving the communication, that the privilege
is lost upon divorce, that the privilege covers communications not
originally intended as confidential or which would have been made
regardless of the marital relation, and that third persons present at
or overhearing the communication generally cannot be kept silent
under the privilege." The latter is definitely one import of the
House of Lords decision in Rumping v. D.P.P.,66 holding proper
the admissibility of a letter, from the defendant husband to his
wife, that contained a virtual confession of murder and which had
been intercepted and held by the police. The court indicated that
the situation might be otherwise, had the wife received the letter
without interception.6
Under the English privilege against adverse spousal testimony,
there are a few isolated types of cases in which both spouses are
deprived of the privilege, somewhat after the fashion of the Wyatt
principle. Thus the legislature seems to have decided that in the
trial of interspousal thefts under the Married Women's Property
Act, a marriage which facilitates the stealing by one consort of the
other's property, is not to be encouraged at the expense of
endangering the chances of conviction of such offenders 70; and
future legislative encroachments of this nature are not impossible.
Furthermore, where the witness-spouse would have been competent
to testify at ancient common law, neither she nor her spouse can
assert the privilege, 1' since the privilege is but an erosion of the
old incompetency. This may afford the courts some latitude to
apply a type of Wyatt approach. Certainly the English courts
66 See, e.g., Phipson, Evidence (1952), p. 213 and cases cited therein. See also
Rumping v. D.P.P., infra.
67 In addition to the material cited in the first part of note 65 supra, see
O'Connor v. Marjoribanks (1842) 4 M. & G. 435 (on the confidentiality and
marital relationship points); Doker v. Hasler (1824) Ry. & M. 198 (semble);
Cowley v. C., The Times, Jan. 20, 1897 (semble); R. v. Smithies (1832) 5
C. & P. 332 (third person point); R. v. Bartlett (1837) 7 C. & P. 832 (semble);
Hamp v. Robinson (1855) 16 L.T. 29 (semble). On all the points compare
the American federal privilege, at notes 4 to 7 supra and accompanying text.
65 (1962) 46 Cr.App.R. 398 (H.L.).
69 Compare text accompanying note 5 supra.
76 Married Women's Property Act, 1884, s. 1 (either consort is an admissible
and, except when defendant, a compellable witness).
71 R. v. Lapworth [1931] 1 K.B. 117 (C.C.A.) (forcible or fraudulent marriage,
" spouse " competent at common law, no privilege). A bigamous marriage is
the same. See note 72 infra for rationale.
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are free to apply the " lack of independent will," " sham
marriage," 72 and " indirect assertion by the dominant spouse of a
lost privilege " analyses, enunciated in Wyatt, wherever
appropriate.7 3
CONCLUSION
The Wyatt case presents a modification of the traditional privilege
against adverse spousal testimony, which modification, if founded
upon the articulated rationale,. makes little sense in that case, but
conceivably might be appropriate in a proper English or American
case; but which, if founded upon a deeper social policy, was
properly applied in that case, and has broader implications
concerning not only the adverse spousal testimony privilege, but,
in England, the confidential marital communications privilege as
well.
72 In forcible or fraudulent marriage, neither spouse has the privilege, Lapworth,
supra, note 71. One of the requirements for the ancient incompetency and the
modern privilege, namely, a bona fide marriage, is missing. See also R. v.
London (Lord Mayor) (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 772, 775-776; Case of Wakefield (1827)
2 Lewin C.C. 279; D.P.P. v. Blady [1912] 2 K.B. 89, 92; Leach v. R. [1912]
A.C. 305 (H.L.); R. v. Blanchard (1952] 1 All E.R. 114 (C.A.). On the
same rationale, the second marriage in a case of bigamy is not a bona fide
marriage, and the second " spouse " is not a spouse and was competent at
common law, so that neither - spouse " has the privilege. Phipson, Evidence
(1952), p. 478. Cf. R. v. Green (1949) 63 J.P. 745.
73 Crimes somewhat analogous to violations of the Mann Act in which it might be
successfully argued that there was a subordination of the will are, e.g.,
procurement (Sexual Offences Act, 1956, ss. 22, 23), taking a young girl from
her parents for purposes of sexual immorality (R. v. Chapman [1959] 1 Q.B.
100 (C.C.A.)), living off the earnings of prostitution (Shaw v. D.P.P. [1961]
2 W.L.R. 897 (H.L.)), defilement of young girls (1956 Act, s. 5), abduction
(s. 6), and other such offences, against young people or mental deficients.
